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Abstract
This paper describes a new protocol for authentication
in ad-hoc networks. The protocol has been designed to
meet specialized requirements of ad-hoc networks, such as
lack of direct communication between nodes or require-
ments for revocable anonymity. At the same time, a ad-
hoc authentication protocol must be resistant to spoofing,
eavesdropping and playback, and man-in-the-middle at-
tacks. The article analyzes existing authentication methods
based on the Public Key Infrastructure, and finds that they
have several drawbacks in ad-hoc networks. Therefore, a
new authentication protocol, basing on established crypto-
graphic primitives (Merkle’s puzzles and zero-knowledge
proofs) is proposed. The protocol is studied for a model ad-
hoc chat application that provides private conversations.
1 Introduction
Authentication services are required by many applications
of ad hoc networks, both mobile (MANETs) or wired, like
peer-to-peer. As an example, consider chats, games, or data
sharing in a ad-hoc network, or in a MANET. As more
practical applications of MANETS will be developed, the
need for authentication services will grow. In addition,
many forms of secure routing in MANTETs or general ad-
hoc networks cannot operate without a form of authentica-
tion.
At the same time, ad-hoc networks and their appli-
cations are more vulnerable to a number of well-known
threats, such as identity theft (spoofing), violation of pri-
vacy, and the man-in-the-middle attack. All these threats
are difficult to counter in an environment where member-
ship and network structure are dynamic and the presence of
central directories cannot be assumed.
Applications of ad-hoc networks can have anonymi-
ty requirements that cannot be easily reconciled with some
forms of authentication known today. On the other hand,
service providers that are bound by legal regulations have
to be able to trace the actions of user of a MANET. Find-
ing a reasonable trade-off between these two requirements
is rather hard. In this paper, we use the term revocable
anonymity for a system in which a user cannot be identi-
fied to the outside world, but a trusted authority is provided
with the possibility to identity actions performed by each
user.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that mo-
bile ad hoc networks can benefit from new, specialized
methods of authentication. In this article, we combine
two cryptographic techniques - Merkle’s puzzles and zero-
knowledge proofs - to develop a protocol for authenti-
cation in ad-hoc networks. This protocol is resistant to
man-in-the-middle and eavesdropping attacks and prevents
identity theft. However, the protocol allows for revocable
anonymity of users and is adapted to the dynamic and de-
centralized nature of these networks. Finally, our protocol
works with any MANET routing protocol and does not as-
sume any properties of MANET routing.
We study the protocol for a model chat application in
an ad-hoc network that needs to authenticate users to con-
tinue concurrent private conversations. Users of the chat
prefer to remain anonymous, but they must have identities
for the duration of the conversation. However, the applica-
tions of an authentication protocol in ad-hoc networks can
be wide, and our authentication protocol can be adapted to
many other applications. In this paper, we aim to demon-
strate the principle that lies behind the new authentication
method, to compare the new method to existing techniques
and to analyze its security and performance.
Organization of paper. In the next section, we consider
how existing techniques such as Public Key Infrastructure
or their modifications can be used for authentication in
MANET applications. We present a simple case study of
a chat application. We demonstrate how the use of PKI
is difficult if users have no previous knowledge of the re-
ceiver of messages. Other disadvantages of PKI are the
lack of global availability and the lack of anonymity. In
section 4.1, we present and explain the cryptographic prim-
itives used in our protocol. Section 4.2 presents the proto-
col, and concludes with an analysis of the protocol’s se-
curity and efficiency. Section 5 concludes and discusses
further work.
2 Related work
General security architectures for MANETs almost exclu-
sively use public key cryptography (PKI or the Web of
trust) [6, 9, 2]. These systems provide authentication with-
out anonymity, and will be discussed in more details below.
Most systems that provide anonymity are not inter-
ested in allowing to trace the user under any circum-
stances. Chaum mixing networks, proxy servers, have not
been designed to provide accountability. For mobile ad
hoc networks, approaches exists that provide unconditional
anonymity, again without any accountability [4].
A Chaum mixing network, mentioned earlier, is a col-
lection of special hosts (mixing nodes) that route user mes-
sages. Each node simply forwards an incoming messages
to other nodes in the mixing network. The path (sequence
of nodes) is chosen by the sender, and the message is put
into envelopes (based on PKI infrastructure), one for each
node on the path.
An area that requires both anonymity and account-
ability is agent systems ([16]). Most of the security archi-
tectures for those systems do not provide any anonymity,
e.g., [1], [3], [20].
However there exists work devoted to different
anonymity aspects e.g. [17].
A different scheme that preserves anonymity is pro-
posed in [8]. The scheme is based on a credential system
and offers an optional anonymity revocation. Its main idea
is based on oblivious protocols, encryption circuits and the
RSA assumption.
3 Authentication in MANET applications
In this section, we discuss a model chat application in a
MANET that will be used to guide our discussion of au-
thentication. However, the conclusions of the discussion
apply to any MANET application that requires authentica-
tion.
3.1 Chat of users in a MANET
Consider a chat application in a mobile ad-hoc network.
The system makes it possible for users to execute two oper-
ations: SALL(m) and SPRIV (u,m). The first operation
sends a message, m to all users in the network. The second
operation sends a private message m to a selected user, u.
Note that a user that executes the SALL operation needs
not to know who receives the message.
The described system is visualized on figure 1. The
SALL and SPRIV messages are routed by the network
using the ROUTE operation (using any MANET routing
protocol). On the figure, the SALLmessage is routed from
user PI to all other users, among them to PU by the nodes
P1 and P3. After that, PU responds by sending a mes-
sage SPRIV to PI . The exchange of private messages
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Figure 1. Chat of users in a MANET
may continue concurrently to the sending of messages to
all users by either PI or PU .
Consider now that the application wishes to authen-
ticate the private message senders. For example, after re-
ceiving the first SPRIV message, the application creates
a file that will contain all messages exchanged by the two
users during a private conversation. Only the user that has
sent the first SPRIV message is authorized to continue
the conversation. In order to enforce this, some form of
authentication is required.
The first question is whether the user address in the
MANET is sufficient for authentication. Is it possible for
a malicious user, PM , to assume the address of an inno-
cent user, PI? In MANETs, the possibility of successfully
spoofing an IP address cannot be overlooked.
Let us assume that PI uses his own address as authen-
tication information. The SPRIV message takes the form
of SPRIV (receiveraddress,m, senderaddress). How-
ever, PM runs a DoS attack against PI , forcing PI to leave
the network. After PI has left, PM joins the network as-
suming the address of PI . Next, PM can take over the pri-
vate conversation of PI .
What is needed to implement access permissions that
allow private conversations? An authentication mechanism
that
• allows a user to authenticate its conversation partners
• does not use centralized control during authentication
• is safe against playback attack
• is safe against eavesdropping
• is safe against man-in-the-middle attack
• provides controlled anonymity
3.2 Case Study: PKI
Before we present a new method of authentication, let us
first describe and analyze available means of providing au-
thentication in MANETs. The most well known (and most
frequently used) method is authentication using public key
cryptography and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certifi-
cates. If such a method is used in a MANET, all users must
obtain a PKI certificate from a certificate authority (CA)
in order to access certain system functions (perhaps some
functions may be available without access control).
An alternative would be to use a trusted source of au-
thentication information that is part of the MANET: a boot-
strap server. This element (we shall refer to it as authenti-
cating bootstrap, AB) issues certificates to users that join
the system. A drawback of this approach is that the identity
of users is not externally verified. A similar approach is to
allow all users to issue certificates like in the PGP ”Web of
trust” model. In [21], this approach has been chosen along
with the use of SPKI; however, this work does not signifi-
cantly differ from the approach described in this case study.
Let us consider, how the described authentication
methods could be used to solve the problem posed above:
implementing access permissions for a chat with private
conversations in a MANET. A proposed solution is shown
on fig. 2.
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Figure 2. Using certificates for authentication in a MANET
application
PI has a certificate,C, that contains its public key and
a signature, SIG. The certificate and the SPRIV message
are routed through the MANET (the message contains a
nonce to avoid playback attacks). For simplicity, let us as-
sume that there is a single, malicious user on the path from
PI to PU . When PU receives the message, he can verify
the validity of the signature and accept the public key of PI
as authentication information. In the future, PU will only
display private messages from PI if the message has been
signed by PI . Verification of the certificate may require
communication with CA or AB, if PU does not know the
public key of the CA or AB.
However, note that the presented scenario is inse-
cure. PM is capable of a man-in-the-middle attack that
exchanges the certificate, C, with a certificate of PM , C′,
and the address of PI with the address of PM . Unless the
receiver, PU , is capable of verifying that the certificate be-
longs to the sender PI , then PM will be able to continue
the conversation of PI afterwards (and PI will not!). To
fix this problem, the proposed protocol has to be modified
as presented on fig. 2. The only way for PU to make sure
that the certificate belongs to PI is to communicate with PI
over a channel that is not controlled by PM and receive a
proof that PI has a private key that matches the public key
in the certificate.
After the private conversation has been accepted by
PU , PI may wish to send messages using another SPRIV
operation. For the second time, authentication can be sim-
pler. PI and PU now know the public keys of each other.
This information, or a secret value associated with the con-
versation during initiation, is enough to establish an en-
crypted channel between PI and PU and to authenticate
PI .
3.3 Disadvantages of using PKI for authen-
tication in MANETs
However, the proposed solution has several drawbacks:
1. It requires direct communication with PI . This may
not be possible if PI is outside the radio range of PU .
2. The certificate must contain the address of PI (or the
system must include a directory where this address
may be found). This requires updates whenever PI
changes its address.
3. Communication with the CA or AB must occur dur-
ing every transaction, if PU does know the public key
of CA or AB.
4. It requires a 3-way exchange of information.
5. If PKI certificates are used, the users cannot be
anonymous.
6. Note that we do not consider how to provide message
integrity during communication from PI to PU . We
focus solely on authentication.
As pointed out in [10], the use of PKI for authen-
tication has other drawbacks. The use of PKI is diffi-
cult because of the necessity of verifying legal identities
of all participants. This is a difficult task, and may limit the
participation of users from countries or geographical areas
where the access to PKI infrastructure is limited. Other
users may have privacy concerns, depending on the type of
application.
Finally, the security of PKI has been questioned due
to its hierarchical nature. In [7], authors observe that if a
high-level certification authority is compromised, then the
result is a failure of a large part of the system. For these rea-
sons, it may be worthwhile to consider a more lightweight,
scalable and robust authentication mechanism for MANET
applications.
4 Proposal
In this paper, we describe a new protocol for authentication
for MANET applications. The protocol allows users to se-
curely send private messages to another user (as described
in section 3).
First, utilized cryptographic primitives are briefly
introduced: the concept of zero-knowledge proofs and
Merkle’s puzzles. Then, we present the authentication pro-
tocol.
4.1 Cryptographic primitives
Our scheme involves two cryptographic primitives:
Merkle’s puzzles and zero-knowledge proofs. We describe
them shortly below.
Merkle’s puzzles Ralph Merkle introduced his concept
of cryptographic puzzles in [18]. The goal of this method
was to enable secure communication between two parties:
A and B, over an insecure channel. The assumptions were
that the communication channel can be eavesdropped (by
any third party, called E). Assume that A selected an en-
cryption function (F ). F is kept by A in secret. A and B
agree on a second encryption function, called G:
G(plaintext, some key) = some encrypted message.
G is publicly known. A will now create M puzzles
(denoted as si, 0 ≤ i ≤M ) in the following fashion:
si = G((K,Xi, F (Xi)), Ri)
K is simply a publicly known constant term, which remains
the same for all messages. The Xi are selected by A at
random. The Ri are the ”puzzle” part, and are also selected
at random from the range (M · (i−1),M · i). B must guess
Ri. For each message, there are N possible values of Ri.
If B tries all of them, he is bound to chance upon the right
key. This will allow B to recover the message within the
puzzle: the triple (K,Xi, F (Xi)). B will know that he has
correctly decoded the message because the constant part,
K, provides enough redundancy to insure that all messages
are not equally likely. Without this provision, B would have
no way of knowing which decoded version was correct, for
they would all be random bit strings. Once B has decoded
the puzzle, he can transmit Xi in the clear. F (Xi) can then
be used as the encryption key in further communications.
B knows F (Xi) because it is in the message. A knows
F (Xi) because A knows Xi, which B transmitted in the
clear, and also knows F, and so can compute F (Xi). E
cannot determine F (Xi) because E does not know F, and
so the value of Xi tells E nothing. E’s only recourse is to
solve all theN puzzles until he encounters the 1 puzzle that
B solved. So for B it easy to solve one chosen puzzle, but
for E is computationally hard to solve all N puzzles.
Zero-knowledge proofs A zero knowledge proof system
([19], [11], [12], [13], [14], [5]) is a protocol that enables
one party to prove the possession or knowledge of a ”se-
cret” to another party, without revealing anything about the
secret, in the information theoretical sense. These proto-
cols are also known as minimum disclosure proofs. Zero
knowledge proofs involve two parties: the prover who pos-
sesses a secret and wishes to convince the verifier, that he
indeed has the secret. As mentioned before, the proof is
conducted via an interaction between the parties. At the
end of the protocol the verifier should be convinced only if
the prover knows the secret. If, however, the prover does
not know it, the verifier will be sure of it with an over-
whelming probability.
The zero-knowledge proof systems are ideal for con-
structing identification schemes. A direct use of a zero-
knowledge proof system allows unilateral authentication of
P (Peggy) by V (Victor) and require a large number of it-
erations, so that verifier knows with an initially assumed
probability that prover knows the secret (or has the claimed
identity). This can be translated into the requirement that
the probability of false acceptance be 2−t where t is the
number of iterations. A zero knowledge identification pro-
tocol reveals no information about the secret held by the
prover under some reasonable computational assumptions.
4.2 The authentication protocol
The proposed protocol offers an authentication method
for the model MANET chat application. The node that
wishes to send a private message is equipped with a zero-
knowledge value. After the setup of a private conversation,
this value will enable only the right node to send new pri-
vate messages. Using the proposed protocol, the authenti-
cation information cannot be used by a node that routes the
message for its own purpose. A short overview is presented
in this section and a detailed description in the next.
The proposed protocol has three phases:
1. initial: when a bootstrap creates necessary values for
authentication
2. initialization of private conversation: the first private
message contains additional zero-knowledge values
that will enable the sender (and no one else) to con-
tinue the private conversation.
3. exchange of private messages: the sender uses a zero-
knowledge proof and Merkle’s puzzles to authenticate
itself and to safely send a private message.
The node that initializes the private conversation is
denoted as PI , the receiving node as PS and nodes that
route the message as P1, P2, . . ., the message as m′ (first
message) and m′′,m′′′, . . . (next messages). A is the au-
thentication data.
In this basic scenario we assume that routing nodes
do not modify the data, just forward it correctly. Attacks:
scenarios where these nodes can modify or eavesdrop in-
formation are described in section 4.3.
Phase 1 - initial This proposal is not directly based on
zero-knowledge protocols, but on an identification system
based on a zero-knowledge proof. We choose the GQ
scheme ([15]) as the most convenient for our purposes. In
this scheme, the bootstrap has a pair of RSA-like keys: a
public KP and a private one kp. The bootstrap also com-
putes public modulus N = p · q, where p, q are RSA-like
primes. The following equation has to be true:
KP × kp ≡ 1(mod (p− 1) · (q − 1)).
The pair (KP , N ) is made public. The keys can be used for
different purposes, not only for our system.
The bootstrap computes a set of so-called identities,
denoted by ID, and their equivalencies, denoted by J . It
does not matter how J is obtained if it is obvious for all par-
ticipants how to obtain J from ID. The pairs (ID, J) are
generated for every node that requests them. The identity
is used to authenticate PI during an attempt to continue the
conversation. The bootstrap also computes a secret value
for each ID:
σ ≡ J−kp(mod N).
The secret σ is used by PI to compute correct values for
the GQ authentication scheme. PI obtains the following
information in the initial phase: ID (public) and σ (secret).
To preserve anonymity, node PI should request at
least a few different pairs (ID, σ) or, if possible, obtain
a new pair for each private conversation (key).
Phase 2 - initialization of the private conversation The
purpose of this phase is to associate a proper ID with the
conversation. Different methods may be used for that pur-
pose, depending on the security and performance require-
ments of the system.
Here are some possibilities:
1. The nodePI can simply send the ID with the message
m in open text. In that situation, the node PI has to
trust all other nodes that they do not change neither
message nor ID.
2. The node PI can ask the bootstrap to store an ID
value associated with the conversation. During con-
versation initialization, PS contacts the bootstrap and
obtains the proper ID.
3. A more secure way is to use the bootstrap’s keys for
a different purpose, not only for the zero-knowledge
protocol. After creation of an ID for node PI in the
initial phase, the bootstrap can sign the ID with his
private key. In this case, the ID can be sent securely
over multiple nodes. After receiving the first message,
PS can check the validity of the bootstrap’s signature
and accept only a valid ID. To provide message in-
tegrity, the bootstrap would have to sign a hash of the
message (h(m)), as well.
Phase 3 - exchange of private messages
1. The node PI creates a set of puzzles: S =
{s1, . . . , sn}. Each puzzle has a zero-knowledge chal-
lenge. This challenge is a number computed basing on
a random value r, r ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. It is computed
as following:
u = rKP (mod N). (1)
Creating a set of puzzles
Each puzzle used in the proposed scheme has a fol-
lowing form: G(K,Xi, F (Xi), u), Ri), whereK ,Xi,
Ri and F , are described in section 4.1. Each puz-
Table 1. Possible puzzles
Puzzle no puzzle
1 (s1) G(K,X1, F (X1), u), R1)
2 (s2) G(K,X2, F (X2), u), R2)
. . .
n (sn) G(K,Xn, F (Xn), u), Rn)
zle can contain a different u value (computed from r),
which gives additional security.
2. The node PI sends the whole set of puzzles to PS .
3. PS solves a chosen puzzle and chooses a random
value b ∈ {1, . . . , N}. PS sends the puzzle’s num-
ber (Xi) and b to PI .
4. The PI computes the next value in the GQ scheme,
v. This values is based on the number b received from
PS and on the secret value σ of PI :
v ≡ r × σb (mod N). (2)
5. PI sends v and a new message (encrypted, using in-
formation from the puzzle). Some possible methods
of securing the message are described below. The se-
cured message has the form:
L(m′, F (Xi)).
6. PS uses information extracted from the puzzle, ID, to
obtain J and verify if v is the right value. To validate
the response from PI , PS checks if
Jb × vKP ≡ u (mod N). (3)
If the equation is satisfied, then the new message is
accepted.
Securing the new message The value F (Xi) is a secret
known only to PS and PI . Thus, it can be used to establish
a secure channel for the new message. This can be used to
provide:
1. encryption: the message could be encrypted using
F (Xi) as a key for a symmetric cipher.
2. integrity: the hash of the message could be encrypted
using a symmetric cipher with key F (Xi).
4.3 Security of proposed scheme
In this section, we are going to discuss only the security
of phase 3 of the protocol, since the protocol offers several
distinct possibilities in phase 2, each one with a different
level of security.
Continuing the conversation by an unauthorized user
Assume that one of the routing nodes (PM ) wishes to send
a private message and impersonate PI . PM cannot imper-
sonate PI , because PM does not have the σ value to obtain
the correct v for the authentication phase of the protocol.
The values u, b or ID do not contain any information that
would be useful in cheating PS . This property is assured
by the zero-knowledge protocol.
The message itself is secured by methods described
in sec 4.2, using the F (Xi) value. For any eavesdropper
it is computationally infeasible to solve all puzzles to find
the puzzle the with proper Xi (the one used by PS) if the
number of puzzles is large enough. E.g. if the function G
would be DES, and Ri would be a key for a cipher with
fixed 24 bits (so efficiently 32 bits long), then the number
of computations required to solve one puzzle is about 231.
Now it is easy to estimate how many puzzles should be
created by PI .
Eavesdropping An eavesdropping node, PM , can ob-
serve all values of the zero-knowledge protocol: u, b and r.
This knowledge does not reveal anything about the secret
σ and since u and b are random and change in every iter-
ation of the protocol, that does not enable PM to interfere
and gain any important information. Also, if the number of
puzzles is sufficiently large, solving all puzzles is infeasi-
ble in reasonable time and finding the puzzle that was used
to secure the message is hard.
Play-back attack Using our protocol, PS chooses a ran-
dom value b and then PI has to compute the v value, which
is later utilized by PS to check if the authentication is suc-
cessful. Therefore, previously used v, r (u) and b values
are useless. Only PI is able to create the proper v value for
a random b.
Man-in-the-middle attack The goal of this attack is to
either change the new message or to gain some informa-
tion about σ by one of the intermediate nodes (PM ). A
property of zero-knowledge proofs used in our protocol is
that gaining any information about u, b and v values does
not reveal anything about the σ. Changing the message is
also not possible since it is protected with the secret value
F (Xi), known only to PI and PS .
4.4 Performance analysis
In the proposed system there are two phases when compu-
tational overhead could be significant:
1. computing values for the zero-knowledge protocol
(equations: 1, 2, 3). The number of computations
needed for these equations is similar to computations
of public key cryptography. The u value (eq. 1) can be
calculated offline.
2. computing the set of puzzles: this also can be done by
PI offline. We assume that the G function would be
DES or any other symmetric cipher, so it would be
quite fast to compute a single puzzle. The amount of
computations depends rather on the number of puzzles
(M ) and is similar to encrypting a message of size
M · n, where n is the size of N in bits (because u <
N ).
3. Sending the set of puzzles is the only significant com-
munication overhead. The size of the set of puzzles
depends on the required security level and is diffi-
cult to estimate (without additional assumptions about
available computational power of malicious nodes).
Moreover, since the breaking of all puzzles should
take more time than the transmission of the entire mes-
sage, perhaps the size of the set of puzzles could de-
pend on the message size (be bounded above by a frac-
tion of the message size, for instance 1%).
4.5 Comparison with PKI
Let us compare our protocol using the same criticism as for
PKI in section 4:
1. direct communication of PI and PS is no longer re-
quired
2. a directory or method to obtain the address of PI by
PS is not necessary
3. communication with the bootstrap may be required
during the initialization of a private conversation, de-
pending on the chosen method of communicating the
ID
4. 3-way exchange of information is not required dur-
ing conversation initialization, but only for subsequent
messages
5. the proposed protocol provides revocable anonymity.
5 Conclusions
Authentication in P2P/ad-hoc systems is surprisingly diffi-
cult due to the fact that nodes often do not know the identity
of each other before they communicate. In a client-server
system, at least the identity of the server is known to the
client. This simplifies the use of PKI for authentication.
In a P2P/ad-hoc system, the use of PKI may require di-
rect communication of two nodes to prevent a man-in-the-
middle attack. This is difficult to realize in a P2P/ad-hoc
system.
We have developed an authentication method that
is secured against eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle, and
playback attacks in a P2P/ad-hoc system, but does not re-
quire direct communication. The proposed method does
not introduce significant computational or communication
overheads. Also, the proposed method provides revocable
anonymity that is not available when PKI is used.
The proposed system of authentication with revocable
anonymity gives quite new possibilities for security solu-
tions in P2P/ad-hoc networks. First, it provides anonymity
of the operating node against other nodes and any external
users, except for the bootstrap. Additionally, the system
makes it possible to identify a node’s actions when coop-
erating with the bootstrap. If practically implemented, the
system can be controlled against a malicious nodes trying
violate the rules of a MANET application. The applica-
tions of this control can range from games in a MANET to
prevention of indecent or malicious messages on MANET
chats.
Future work The form of anonymous authentication and
revocable anonymous authentication should perhaps de-
pend on the particular MANET application. Thus, the first
possible extension of the results presented here is a precise
analysis of requirements of chosen MANET applications.
This problem will be the subject of future research.
Another extension of the presented results is to offer
new security services. The first natural proposition is mu-
tual authentication of nodes, then non-repudiation of op-
erations and finally combinations of all common security
services applied to nodes and the routed messages.
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